THE CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED (CALL)

News from the Front!

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IN THIS ISSUE!

Operation Mountain Eagle Lessons - Stability Ops (4QFY95 and 1QFY96)

by Members of the Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC)

The following information provides Observer/Controllers (O/C) observations and lessons collected during Stability Operations training at CMTC, Hohenfels, Germany. CMTC has been training both U.S. and other NATO forces in Europe on stability operations since 1993. Recently, CMTC conducted an extensive effort to prepare U.S. units for deployment to Bosnia-Herzegovina (BH). CMTC continues to conduct normal brigade rotations while providing training for additional personnel deploying in support of the BH mission. For more information, contact Operations Group S3, CMTC at 011-49-9472-83-4458/59 (DSN 466). For a complete listing of all the observations and lessons, visit the CALL Homepage (WWW) at http://call.army.mil:1100/call.html. Following are the top 11 lessons as selected by the O/C

COMMAND AND CONTROL

OBSERVATION: There is inconsistent dissemination and understanding of the Rules of Engagement (ROE).

DISCUSSION: Commanders at all levels must ensure that ROE are fully understood by all, and that correct, current ROE are disseminated. ROE must be known and understood by all soldiers in the area of responsibility (AOR), including those assigned, attached, and collocated. Poor dissemination of ROE leads to confusion about the rules of self-defense and when force is authorized to complete a mission.

A Reminder!

If you have articles and lessons of interest to the Total Force, please contact the Managing Editor, Dr. Lon R. Seglie, at Coml (913) 684-3035/9567 or DSN 552-3035/9567; FAX DSN 552-9564.

Just *call us* at DSN 552-2255/3035; Coml (913) 684-2255/3035

Our *FAX No.* is DSN 552-9564; Coml (913) 684-9564.

Our *E-mail address* is: call@leav-emh1.army.mil

Our *WWW home page* is: http://call.army.mil:1100/call.html

THE EDITORIAL STAFF

***Director, CALL* - COL Edward J. Fitzgerald III**

***Managing Editor* - Dr. Lon R. Seglie**

***Editor plus Layout and Design* - Mary Sue Winneke**

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LESSON(S):

✷ **Consider using** R**eturn Fire with Aimed Fire,** A**nticipate Attack,** M**easure the Amount of Force,** P**rotect with Deadly Force-Only Human Life** (RAMP) **as a device to help soldiers learn the ROE.**

✷ **Consider using separate ROE cards for leaders and soldiers. Soldier cards should explain the right of self-defense and immediate actions (such as RAMP) and the leader card would address graduated force responses.**

✷ **Include vignette and scenario training in teaching ROE.**

✷ **Double-check slice elements; do not assume they received their ROE training at home station.**

✷ **Ensure that ROE training continues throughout deployment.**

✷ **Integrate lessons learned into ROE training scenarios.**

✷ **Emphasize that soldiers always have the right of self-defense, regardless of the mission.**

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OBSERVATION: In a Peace Enforcement environment projected for forces, some Battlefield Operating Systems (BOS) have less applicability than in High Intensity Conflict (HIC), while other elements, not normally assigned, become crucial.

DISCUSSION: The projected AOR is one where treaties reduce the threat of massed ground forces and artillery, and operational/ strategic-level elements, such as Operation DENY FLIGHT, greatly reduce the conventional air threat. Conversely, the center of gravity for the operation also involves the populace, to include paramilitary forces, multiple factions, religious leaders, and local leaders.

LESSON(S):

✷ **The Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations, and Counterintelligence staff elements play a much larger role in the success of a peace operation. Consider realigning the staff from normal (in HIC) activities of synchronizing operations to analysis and projection activities with different emphasis than Intelligence/Maneuver/FS/M-CM-S/Air Defense operations.**

✷ **Consider nonconventional roles for elements structured for HIC operations; for example, use of SHORAD elements for convoy or movement security; use of FA transportation elements (FAASV and 5-ton trucks) for resupply and convoy action.**

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OBSERVATION: Strategic consequences of tactical actions and information flow to the lowest level.

DISCUSSION: In the peace enforcement environment, information flow to the lowest level is crucial. Each soldier should have a great situational awareness, and must take actions which are consistent with his orders and their intended context. Each soldier should also consider the consequences of his actions, since a decision and associated action by a soldier may have strategic consequences.

LESSON(S):

✷ Disseminate maps, graphics, ROE and the Peace Accord to the lowest possible level.

✷ Keep soldiers informed of the current situation and communicate. Rehearse all anticipated actions. To be successful, each leader and unit must ensure:

✔ There are accurate, current battle rosters of all soldiers working in the unit, including all assigned, attached, and OPCON personnel.

✔ That accurate, real-time reporting of all incidents move up the chain of command.

✔ SOPs are known and followed by all personnel.

✔ That you are what you appear to be: Soldier discipline and appearance are key; specifically, all soldiers must appear in correct, clean, serviceable uniforms.

✷ Each soldier and leader must have:

✔ An understanding of the current status regarding factions, forces, and the civil situation.

✔ A correct, current ROE.

✔ An understanding of the Peace Accord.

INTELLIGENCE

OBSERVATION: The S2 must fully understand how to maintain incident overlays and conduct pattern analysis.

DISCUSSION: Pattern analysis is critical to COA development, focusing R&S plans, and developing countermeasures. S2s generally have a system for plotting incident overlays; however, the information must then be collated and analyzed to determine increasing threats in specific areas or to develop threat models.

LESSON(S): S2s should develop systems for maintaining and analyzing large volumes of information (pattern analysis). Recommended TTPs include:

✷ Maintain an incident overlay for a 24-hour period with three overlays (72 hours worth of events) on the map at a time. This overall incident overlay will assist the S2 in discerning immediate operational patterns.

✷ Transfer the overall incident overlay data onto long-term event overlays (i.e., one overlay for sniper attacks, one for road blocks, one for mortar attacks, etc.). These overlays will assist the S2 in deciding patterns for types of events.

✷ Information relevant to each event (debriefs of participants, etc.) should be maintained in files for future reference.

✷ A simple computer data base program can be used to more quickly decide patterns. By entering information on a series of variables (fields), the S2 can use the computer to determine correlations between events and within a type of event.

OBSERVATION: S2s must leverage all intelligence assets and agencies to conduct sufficient IPB and R&S planning to support operations in a stability operations environment.

DISCUSSION: Intelligence responsibilities are greatly expanded during stability operations. In a situation requiring the separation of belligerent factions and control of a zone of separation (ZOS), the S2 must conduct terrain analysis which concentrates not only on the traditional military factors (OCOKA), but also takes into account the environmental factors of the population and potential support structures for paramilitary/terrorist threats in the AOR. The IPB process must be completed for the conventional threat (separated belligerent forces) as well as the potential paramilitary/terrorist threat posed to each mission. While the S2 has doctrinal templates for the belligerent forces - and can develop familiar HIC situation and event templates for these - he must develop threat models, incident overlays, and event templates based on his own analysis of paramilitary/terrorist activity.

Similarly, R&S plans must be constantly updated and refined - with assets tasked and monitored - based on the different missions and changing conditions in the AOR. Traditional HIC intelligence assets (OPs, patrols, etc.) must be tasked to monitor the separated belligerent forces and movements within the ZOS. Additional HUMINT assets (CI, CA, PSYOP), or any unit having contact with the local populace, must be focused to collect information on the attitude of the population and activity of potential threat groups. Finally, the collected information must be filed, collated, and analyzed to develop patterns and produce threat models.

LESSON(S):

✷ S2s must conduct traditional IPB for the AOR concentrating on the threat posed by the separated belligerent factions (FM 34-130) as well as expanded IPB for the populace - paramilitary - terrorist threat to missions (FM 34-130; FM 34-7). Similarly, R&S plans must provide for direct surveillance of the separated belligerents and the avenues of approach into the ZOS as well as direct collection within the AOR to determine the attitude and allegiances of the population and activity of potential paramilitary groups.

✷ To meet the expanded mission requirements of stability operations, S2s must take full advantage of the assets and technology available to them. Suggestions include:

✔ Tasking the DS FA Battalion S2 to conduct pattern analysis of artillery and mortar attacks.

✔ Requiring the CI operational control element (OCE) to outbrief and debrief soldiers who routinely travel through the area.

✔ Creating an all-source analytical cell using S2 analysts, soldiers from the MI company platoon operations center (POC), and personnel from the OCE.

✔ Using Terrabase and other available systems whenever possible to assist in terrain and threat analysis.

✔ Using subject matter experts in the IPB process when developing R&S plans (i.e., have a sniper determine the best locations for shots when establishing NAIs to check for snipers).

✔ Realign the staff to better support intelligence operations, particularly in the establishment of an analysis cell to process the many intelligence reports.

MANEUVER

OBSERVATION: Units training for a stability operation environment demonstrated a tendency to focus on the occupation of the ZOS.

DISCUSSION: Moving into the AOR is not the most difficult part of the operation. It is just the first part of the mission. Units believe it is difficult because this is what they trained on and are most familiar with executing. This ZOS fixation is directly attributable to the planning and preparation done prior to deployment. Unknowns, such as factional leader information, non-governmental organization (NGO), private volunteer organization (PVO) presence in the AOR, ethnic composition and location of noncombatants, and identification of local leaders, are considered only after the unit deploys and occupation of the ZOS begins.

LESSON(S):

✷ During planning, include assessments of all possible sources of information, including NGOs/PVOs, forces in the AOR, and open source material.

✷ As with any military operation, once the operation begins, continue the assessment and evaluation of the tactical plan to ensure the best possible use of forces. Be willing to change the plan and associated subunit missions and AORs based on the actual situation encountered.

FIRE SUPPORT

OBSERVATION: Applicability of Firefinder Radar zones during Stability Operations is not well understood.

DISCUSSION: Fire support personnel automatically employ Critical Friendly Zones (CFZs) based on lessons taught and learned during high intensity operations. When a Firefinder radar predicts that an incoming round will impact inside a CFZ, the location of the weapon firing is immediately targeted for counterfire and entered into the fire support system as a Priority l call for fire.

During high intensity conflict, the CFZ assists in prioritizing the large number of radar acquisitions and competing requests for indirect fire. During stability operations, there probably will not be the large number of radar acquisitions and competing calls for fire routinely experienced during high intensity operations. An extensive list of fire missions waiting to be processed should not develop. Therefore, any acquisition will be a priority for potential response. Fire support personnel do not routinely use Censor Zones (CZs) during stability operations because friendly indirect fire assets may be required to fire in any direction and because radars will be tasked to look in all directions. The chance of a radar unintentionally acquiring a friendly weapon system as a target is increased. A CZ prevents the unintentional acquisition of a friendly weapon system firing toward the radar. Indirect fire weapon systems that fire from this zone are not processed as a target by the Firefinder radar.

LESSON(S):

✷ Do not automatically use CFZs during stability operations since all acquisitions will already be a priority for action.

✷ Place CZs over all friendly indirect fire weapon system locations. Battle-track radar zones to ensure they are updated as the situation changes. Hold the brigade targeting officer

responsible for establishing, moving, confirming, and canceling radar zones. Implement a system to ensure proper entry and recording of zones. Discuss current and planned radar zones at all targeting meetings and fire support rehearsals

(Ref: FM 6-121, *Field Artillery Target Acquisition*).

MOBILITY/COUNTERMOBILITY/SURVIVABILITY

OBSERVATION: Nonmetallic, buried mine detection continues to be a problem.

DISCUSSION: Units were not using vehicles with mine rollers as the lead vehicles during initial route clearance or deliberate sweep of a route or lodgement assembly area. MICLICs and probing can provide breaching or location capability.

LESSON(S):

✸That units lead with mine roller vehicles when conducting route clearing, route proofing, or lodgement area clearing.

✸That SOPs be developed for using MICLICs and probing for breaching nonmetallic, buried minefields.

OBSERVATION: Centralized management of engineers is essential to ensure the most appropriate use of this critical asset.

DISCUSSION: Engineer assets are often sitting idle and their efforts are often spread throughout the TF AOR. The effort, location of the engineers and of the CLASS IV materials, and priorities of work must be synchronized with the TF priority of work. The TF often loses visibility of the engineer assets and their status as the TF remains vulnerable while survivability assets lay idle. Sustainment of engineers in direct support of the maneuver unit must be monitored by the supported unit to get maximum effort and efficiency.

LESSON(S):

✸ Treat the engineer effort as if it were a daily preparation of the defense in HIC.

✸ Do not piecemeal the effort; assign teams of engineers to complete entire projects before they move on to the next site; weigh the main effort.

✸ Assign an individual within each CO/TM who tracks all digging and mine-clearing efforts.

✸ Have a positive handover of assets from company to company by the XO.

✸ Develop a system in the TOC to track route clearance and the engineer effort for checkpoints, observation posts, lodgement areas, survivability positions, and other activities.

✸ Review and update the daily priority of effort and work and then synchronize the delivery of CLASS IV to the sites. Ideally, when the engineers arrive, the correct amounts of CLASS IV are available and ready for construction.

✸ Place command emphasis on the TF priority of support to engineers for all classes of supply and maintenance.

✸ **Monitor the status of critical assets (rollers, plows, ACEs, SEEs, CEVs, etc.) in the TOC.**

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

OBSERVATION: Battalions training at the CMTC are not prepared to conduct extended cold weather operations.

DISCUSSION: Battalions do not have or do not bring sufficient tents and tent stoves to protect soldiers from the elements. Some organizations that have tents decide not to erect the tents. Instead, many units allow soldiers to sleep in vehicles. Battalions neither plan for nor conduct adequate maintenance on tracked vehicle heaters. In some cases, 40 percent of the tracked vehicle heaters checked were inoperative. Many of the heaters arrived at CMTC in a state of disrepair. Subsequently, many of the heaters that were operational were used continually until they burned out. The battalions' lack of PLL and maintenance plan ensured the heaters remained inoperative.

LESSON(S):

✸ **Have adequate tentage and stoves on hand to ensure the welfare of all soldiers. Ensure tents and tent stoves are properly erected and used.**

✸ **Adjust and validate existing load plans to accommodate tentage, stoves, and other cold weather equipment.**

✸ **Train soldiers and discipline them to use tent stoves safely.**

✸ **Repair broken tracked vehicle heaters and establish a system to track heater status. Maintain float heaters on hand at battalion level to facilitate rapid exchange of broken heaters. Designate and train an organizational mechanic as a heater repairman. Maintain a small, but adequate, heater PLL at battalion level.**

OBSERVATION: Class IV stocks, both initial and sustainment, are critical supply assets.

DISCUSSION: The full range of field services, such as latrine construction, was not exercised. Internal distribution and prioritization of Class IV stocks burdened units in maximizing their usage. Initial stockage of Class IV material, particularly plywood and 2x4s should be provided for all mission requirements. Initial stocks may exceed shipping capability, thus local purchase for both initial establishment and Class IV sustainment are required.

LESSON(S):

✸ Establish a total Class IV requirement for stability operations. Include material for all slice/attached OPCON units.

✸ Determine checkpoint, sign, latrine, fighting position and living area requirements.

✸ Plan for local procurement and establish contracting officers at the company lodgement level.

✸ Include Class IV requirements in overall resupply operations. ✪

RECEPTION, STAGING, ONWARD MOVEMENT AND INTEGRATION (RSOI) AT THE NATIONAL TRAINING CENTER (NTC)

by Major Dan McRoberts, Chief, G2 Plans, Ops Grp, Fort Irwin, CA 92310

RSOI at the NTC adds a new dimension to training rotations. An outgrowth of the post-Cold War era, it is designed to exercise force projection doctrine and encompasses the rotational unit's first week of training.

The title "RSOI" is relatively new, in line with our doctrine, yet still in its evolutionary stages. RSOI is driven by an analysis of the specific elements of the deployment process: 1) Reception -- unit arrival in theater; 2) Staging -- building combat power; integration of combat-ready equipment and personnel; marshaling area activities; 3) Onward Movement -- unit deployment from the staging area to its gaining command in the field; 4) Integration -- unit arrival at the tactical assembly area of the gaining command and integration into its command and control structure.

Rotational units deploy to the NTC based on a prearranged scenario. The unit becomes part of Joint Task Force (JTF) Mojave, within the area of responsibility of U.S. Irwin Command (USIRCOM). Their mission in theater is to counter or deter aggression.

The objectives of RSOI are five-fold: 1) place immediate tactical requirements on the Brigade Combat Team upon its arrival in theater; 2) replicate the draw of pre-positioned equipment; 3) interface with the theater logistics base; 4) replace what was previously an administrative draw week with a tactical RSOI scenario leading up to conventional operations; 5) provide observer-controller observations of the unit's effort to build combat power. An associated objective of RSOI is to familiarize the rotational unit with the complexity of tactical operations under the constraints of peacetime Rules of Engagement (ROE).

The research and planning that went into the creation of RSOI is based on various documents. The most notable are **FM 100-5, *Operations,* FM 100-17, *Mobilization, Deployment, Redeployment and Demobilization;* FM 100-17-1, *Army Prepositioned Afloat,* and FM 100-23, *Peace Operations.***

As outlined in FM 100-5, the stages of force projection are mobilization, deployment, entry operations, operations, postconflict or post-crisis operations, redeployment and demobilization. RSOI focuses on the deployment and entry operations stages. Only the unit is in a position to assess its proficiency at mobilizing, as well as demobilizing. The operations stage consists of conventional training in NTC's live-fire and maneuver areas and, therefore, does not pertain to RSOI. Moreover, the post-conflict or post-crisis stage currently is not encompassed by RSOI.

The unit examines aspects of its own development such as predeployment activities, movement to ports of embarkation and strategic airlift. Upon arrival in theater, the unit is observed by logisticians, technicians and trainers at the NTC as it enters the RSOI phase of its training and conducts entry operations.

In replicating Irwin Military City and the theater logistics base in the Republic of Mojave, the NTC represents a semi-mature theater. Accordingly, the rotational unit conducts unopposed entry operations upon arrival. Unit requirements in this regard, as specified by FM 100-5, are: 1) Protect the force; 2) Assist forward-presence or host-nation forces; 3) Build combat capability; 4) Reconfigure; 5) Acclimate; 6) Train.

Protecting the force encompasses such unit actions as the operation of a checkpoint, reconnaissance and security of routes, fratricide prevention, enforcement of safety standards, conduct of preventive medicine, activation of air defense measures, conduct of liaison with local authorities and the exercise of sound Operations Security (OPSEC).

Assisting forward-presence or host-nation forces involves a multiplicity of potential missions. Among them are relief in place, clearing obstacles and mines, delivering supplies, securing borders, routes and lodgements and conducting show-of-force operations.

Building combat capability includes interfacing with the theater logistics base, conducting large-unit supply operations, constituting CSS units rapidly to support the overall effort, drawing equipment, training personnel and conducting marshaling activities to integrate combat-ready personnel and equipment. The preferred method is to approach this task by building combat-capable units over time with specific standards and goals specified and tracked by the brigade chain of command. The average length of time consumed by rotational units in the "building" of the entire Brigade Combat Team at the NTC is six days.

Reconfiguring encompasses tailoring the force to the mission, task-organizing, prioritizing the effort to build combat-capable units and establishing command, control, communications and intelligence as rapidly as possible. Both the plan and method for task organization in relation to the equipment draw are vital issues for the unit to resolve prior to arrival.

Acclimating is a multi-faceted process. To operate effectively in a foreign theater, troops must adjust to the physical environment (climate, weather and terrain). They must also be sensitive to the cultural environment, understanding social, political, economic and religious factors characterizing the geographical area in which they are operating.

Training entails all of those actions that make a unit combat ready. In the context of force projection, some of the more important topics include actions on contact, ROE, Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) provisions and stipulations, OPSEC, Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO), crowd/riot control and reaction to the media. Conventional combat training must also continue as the unit conducts marshaling activities. As always, safety remains a top training priority.

From the moment of arrival at the Aerial Port of Debarkation (APOD) to redeployment, the unit engages in force protection and acclimation. These are processes that never cease. Building combat power, reconfiguration and training occur once the unit enters its staging area. Soon thereafter, the Brigade Combat Team must be prepared to assist forward-presence or host-nation forces. Therefore, the unit must be able to provide tactical support before it has completed staging operations at the brigade level. This also explains why combat organizations are built incrementally.

The structure provides the means to make available some combat capability (a certain number of companies and/or teams) for rapid deployment as soon as possible.

The fictitious command structure that drives RSOI parallels that of a Unified Command and, therefore, is joint in nature. The Commanding General of NTC serves in the capacity of the Commander-in Chief (CINC), USIRCOM. The Commander of Operations Group (COG), assumes the role of Commander, Joint Task Force (JTF) Mojave, and U.S. Army Forces. The other service commands are USMARIRCOM, USNAVIRCOM, USAFIRCOM and SOCIRCOM.

RSOI allows the rotational brigade to exercise a "road to war" timeline. While attending the Leader's Training Program (LTP) at the NTC, the unit's command and staff element receives an RSOI orientation briefing. After returning to home station, the unit begins to involve itself in the RSOI scenario for planning purposes.

Observer/Controllers (O/C) assigned to NTC observe the unit during RSOI and provide feedback to unit leaders through the AAR process. To gather a comprehensive view of unit activities during RSOI, O/C use the following frame of reference: 1) Intelligence --strategic and tactical information processing; 2) Building Logistics Power --large unit supply actions such as breaking down and issuing supply commodity items; theater logistics base interface, including the opening of theater accounts; 3) Training -- ROE, safety, environment and other critical subjects; 4) Building Combat Power --marshaling activities, equipment personnel integration, staging area operations; 5) Force Protection -- OPSEC, sensitive items and ammunition security and movement control in the staging area; 6) Battle Command -- 'See Yourself" issues (nature, condition, status).

Keys to success during RSOI include developing and implementing a plan to build combat power and a system for tracking such an effort. Intermediate goals, established by the chain of command, help measure progress and facilitate the adjustment of priorities during RSOI. Additionally, it is important to brief soldiers on the in-country political and tactical situations. Soldiers then understand the larger themes driving the scenario. These include the reason for deployment, the names of the countries involved, as well as friendly and potential enemy forces. The degree to which the unit has been briefed becomes apparent when media representatives from the fictitious news network interview soldiers and their leaders at all levels and ask questions pertaining to these very issues.

RSOI is the primary vehicle by which force projection doctrine is trained at the NTC. In time, it will have a decisive impact on the Army's ability to conduct unopposed theater entry operations worldwide. As more units experience RSOI as a standard feature of NTC rotations, it will become an integral part of home-station training. Along with other adjustments made to address a changing world situation, RSOI training at the NTC is a significant training step into a new era.

For further information or questions concerning this article contact CPT Terry Morgan, CALL CTC Division, DSN 552-9598/3035 or Coml (913) 684-9598/3035. An RSOI Newsletter is currently in production at CALL. This newsletter provides a method of tracking combat power development and recommendations on how to quickly and effectively build combat power during reception, staging and onward movement of equipment and personnel. It will also include the most recent RSOI changes at the NTC. The authors are MAJ Michael Mahoney and CPT Terry Morgan.✪

SYNCHRONIZATION IN PEACE OPERATIONS

by CPT Joseph J. Dichairo and MAJ Robert Brown, 25th ID(L)

As the U.S. military's participation in Peace Operations continues to increase, the need for the modification of existing planning and execution products grows. There is no doubt that the use of existing methods for planning and executing operations is applicable to Peace Operations. However, there is significant room for the development of modifications allowing units to properly execute these complicated operations. In Peace Operations, a multitude of operational multipliers can enhance unit performance if they are incorporated into the mission. Based on lessons learned during a recent 25th ID (L) JRTC Peacekeeping rotation and participation in Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY in Haiti, several useful Peace Operations products are presented in this article. These products offer a "checklist" that will assist leaders in employing and synchronizing all of the assets available during Peace Operations. Like all checklist products, there are a variety of modifications that can be made to adjust the checklists to your particular situation. The product presented in this article includes a detailed look at the Battlefield Operating Systems (BOSs) in relation to Peace Operations and provides a useful series of BOS checklists to ensure all assets are considered and coordinated properly during these complex operations.

Conducting Peace Operations involves synchronizing many of the same BOSs you would synchronize during normal operations. However, synchronizing Peace Operations requires application of numerous assets from a variety of the BOSs to complete the mission. Due to the nature of Peace Operations, you apply these assets under very different conditions which infantry forces are not typically trained to deal with. Additionally, you must consider the Rules of Engagement (ROE) and the commander's endstate during the employment of these assets. For example, during the execution of a "street sweep" in Port Au Prince during the height of operations in Haiti, numerous non-organic assets were employed with light infantry forces to complete this typical "force projection" mission. Military Police, PSYOP, host-nation and international police forces, civil affairs, and even Special Forces assets were employed alongside infantry companies. The purpose of the street sweep was two fold: first, search for and confiscate weapons as part of the weapons buy-back program and second, saturate the population with forces to gain and maintain stability in Haiti's center of gravity, Port Au Prince. Enforcing strict ROE was a necessity since forces worked closely with the population and their mission required occasional use of force.

To accomplish the synchronization of these assets under varying conditions in which infantry forces were not accustomed, the Peace Operations Synchronization Tool (POST) was created in preparation for the deployment to Haiti. Later, upon transition with the 10th Mountain Division, the POST was modified to fit the needs of daily operations. Its purpose is to synchronize Peace Operations throughout the Multi-National Forces (MNF) joint staff. Synchronizing these operations is similar to planning for deep targets and conducting targeting meetings using the BOS as a guide. It is done daily among the MNF staff, kept updated, and adjusted accordingly based on METT-T/P ("P"- political situation).

The first step in synchronizing Peace Operations is determining which missions require significant coordination among the MNF joint staff. Reviewing the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) publications on Peace Operations is a necessity to determine this. Additionally, reviewing lessons learned from past JRTC rotations (including peacekeeping rotations), analyzing the mission commander's intent and endstate provide enough guidance to determine the synchronization effort.

Next, reviewing assets available provides some insight on how organic assets become Peace Operation combat multipliers, thus requiring synchronization. For example, combining PSYOP, Special Forces and Military Police during an "out-of-sector" mission (a common mission during Peace Operations which entails deploying a mix of forces on a short-term mission throughout a specific area of operations) requires extensive coordination. Although these are traditional assets by themselves, combining them under the conditions of Peace Operations and restrictive ROE requires the staff to understand each forces' capabilities and limitations. Combining these forces also generates different command, control and logistical support issues.

The POST checklist is set up to mirror the BOS. The only exceptions are the initial Mission Analysis checklist and the additional "requirements" developed to ensure each mission is synchronized.

The Mission Analysis checklist (see Figure 1) provides a quick review of those assets or coordination necessary to complete a particular peacekeeping mission. It is a simple series of checks to review before conducting an analysis of each BOS.

Developing the "requirements" under each BOS is a process of wargaming those areas requiring intensive coordination. The concept in selecting "requirements" is to identify those requirements requiring coordination among the MNF joint staff and between maneuver units. There was no particular reference to do this; time and experience in country helped identify the areas which required coordination.

The POST checklist is an effective system to synchronize peacekeeping. However, it requires supervision. Additionally, it forces the joint staff to cross-talk, which is absolutely essential in any large-scale operation. To supervise the employment of the POST and assist the MNF to communicate, one of the J3 Battle Captains was appointed the "CINC POST checklist." Among his normal duties as the Battle Captain, he was also responsible for providing overwatch for the POST.

With guidance to synchronize operations on a daily basis, while simultaneously synchronizing operations four days out and additionally synchronizing long-range missions (7-10 days out), the Battle Captain and key players among the MNF staff complete the POST checklist. This is done daily prior to the morning shift change brief held at 1100. Next, the Battle Captain reviews the POST checklist (see Figure 2) identifying errors or critical missions requiring visibility by an Operations Chief (in this case, a Major). The Battle Captain and the Operations Chief review the checklist, confirm it, and have it put into slide format on completion of this initial "scrub." Prior to each shift change brief, all liaison officers (LOs) and the Battle Captain meet and conduct a brief "synch" meeting. This meeting verifies that all mission requirements are met for those upcoming missions and allows LOs to cross-talk with one another. This cross-talking became extremely critical especially when dealing with other nations contributing to the peacekeeping effort. Language barriers, customs, and standing operating procedures are different among many nations. Nothing could be taken for granted. Normally the "synch" meetings identified that LOs required additional assets to complete a particular mission. For LOs from one brigade, it was time-sensitive to identify and allocate assets because of the distance separating the resource "allocations" and the brigade (six hours by vehicle).

To show the whole joint staff (including the J3 and Chief of Staff) the synchronization efforts and the status of the synchronization process, the POST was placed into overhead slides and briefed at the morning shift-change brief. Briefing the POST checklist at the conclusion of the morning shift brief prevented the J-staff from having another coordinating meeting (among numerous other updates, briefs, and shift-change briefs) just to brief the POST. Each "requirement" (see POST checklist) was color-coded green if coordinations were complete, amber if they were "working," and red if coordination was incomplete.

This technique allowed the J3 and Chief of Staff to maintain visibility on critical mission requirements.

There are numerous benefits from creating and using the POST checklist. Empowering the J-staff and unit LOs to cross-talk and coordinate is by far the greatest benefit. Missions consistently change, sometimes on very short notice. The combination of the POST checklist and the synch brief allows unit LOs to request additional assets immediately to complete missions. Ensuring that the J3 and Deputy are informed is another benefit. They can attend the shift-change brief and receive accurate information on the current status of each MNF mission. Understanding what coordination is complete or incomplete allows the flexibility to shift critical assets (aviation, for example).

The POST checklist and synchronization meetings accomplished the initial intent. However, after numerous minor modifications, the POST became the focal point of the Joint staff's coordination among the MNF staff. The MNF staff was able to accomplish many new, unfamiliar and nonstandard missions due to the identification of special mission requirements. The MNF staff continued to use the POST checklist throughout the Haiti deployment. It proved to be of particular value during the UN transition. Demonstrating the value of synchronizing and coordinating missions may have found its place in UN operations in Haiti. Hopefully, it will find a place in future Peace Operations missions and Combat Training Center (CTC) rotations.

For additional information or questions on the Post Synchronization Checklists, contact CPT Dichairo, 25th ID(L) at Coml (808) 655-4822/0025, DSN 455-4822/0025.



MISSION ANALYSIS CHECKLIST

MISSION:

DATE:

Required for this MSN	*Action Complete*
TIME ANALYSIS	
USE OF LINGUISTS	
IPB COMPLETED	
JOINT INFORMATION BUREAU (JIB) ASSETS	
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (CI) ASSETS	
COAST GUARD	
PHOTO-TELESYSTEM ASSETS	
ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS TASK FORCE (ARSOTF) ASSETS	
CIVIL MILITARY OPERATIONS CENTER (CMOC) COORDINATION,	
GOVERNMENT OF HAITI (GOH)	
VIP COORDINATION	
EMBASSY COORDINATION	
PYSOP ASSETS	
AVIATION ASSETS	
FIXED-WING ASSETS	
MP ASSETS	
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE TRAINING &	
ASSISTANCE PROGRAM (ICITAP) COORDINATION	
INTERNATIONAL POLICE SECURITY FORCE (IPSF)/	
INTERNATIONAL POLICE MONITORS (IPM) COORDINATION	
LOGISTICAL REQUIREMENTS CL I, III, V	
COMBAT CAMERA (COMCAM)	
DEPARTMENT OF STATE (DOS) COORDINATION	
UN MISSION HAITI (UNMIH) COORDINATION	
UN CIVIL POLICE (UNCIVPOL) COORDINATION	
EFFECTED UNITS	
USFORHAITI	

FIGURE 1

BOS ANALYSIS
POST-SYNCHRONIZATION CHECKLIST

Required for this MSN	*INTELLIGENCE*	*Action Complete*
AREA ASSESSMENT CHECKLIST		
TARGET FOLDER		
PIR DEVELOPED		
DEBRIEF FORMAT		

MANEUVER

AVIATION COORDINATION

✔SCOUT WEAPONS TEAM (SWT), C^2 AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL (ATC)/FAA, LZ, PZ (PRIMARY, ALT)
✔MANIFEST/BUMP PLAN
✔A^2C^2 CONCERNS, FARP
✔AIR MISSION COORDINATION (AMC), AIR MISSION BRIEF (AMB)

CONVOY/MOTORCADE/COORDINATION

✔TRAFFIC CONTROL POINTS
✔CONVOY CDR, SUPPORT, CONVOY CHECKLIST, BRIEFING
✔SECURITY, CONFIGURATION
✔PRIMARY AND ALTERNATE ROUTES

STATIC SECURITY OP

✔REPORT OF MSN CHANGEOVER
✔COORD W/GOH, CIV SECURITY

VIP VISITS

✔ESCORTS, TRANSPORTATION
✔SECURITY, ITINERARY, BILLETING
✔UNITS TO VISIT

RANGE COORDINATION

✔AIR ASSETS, PSYOP
✔EOD, SAFETY
✔CLASSES I, III, V
✔COMMO
✔TNG PLAN, CONCURRENT TNG

FIGURE 2

POST-SYNCHRONIZATION CHECKLIST (Cont)

Required for this MSN	*MANEUVER (Cont)*	*Action complete*

QRF COORDINATION (UPON ASSUMPTION)

✔COMMO CHECKS, HOT LOOP, FM TACFAX
✔QUICK REACTION FORCE
✔EXECUTION CHECKLIST W/CODEWORDS
✔PICK-UP TARGET FOLDERS

OUT-OF-SECTOR MISSION

✔MULTI-NATIONAL FORCES (MNF) FRAGO
✔CG APPROVAL
✔ARSOTF COORDINATION
✔MANEUVER UNIT COORDINATION

OTHER MISSIONS (GOH ASSISTANCE, MISC)

✔MANEUVER UNITS
✔J4/JOINT LOGISTICS SUPPORT COMMAND (JLSC) COORDINATION
✔USACOM COORDINATION/APPROVAL
✔SJA ASSISTANCE

SATURATION/PRESENCE PATROLS

✔IPM/IPSF COORDINATION
✔ADJACENT UNIT
✔DEBRIEF SCHEDULED
✔TACTICAL PSYOP TEAM (TPT) THEME

WEAPONS BUY-BACK

✔SITE SETUP, SECURITY
✔PMO FEEDBACK
✔REPORTING PROCEDURES (DAILY UPDATES 1500, 1800)

STREET SWEEPS

✔MAINTAINING OPSEC
✔SITE SETUP, SECURITY
✔ROTATION OF SITE/COORD W/LOCAL BUSINESS OWNERS
✔REPORTING

FIGURE 2 (Cont)

POST-SYNCHRONIZATION CHECKLIST (Cont)

MISSION:
DATE:

Required for this MSN	*MANEUVER (Cont)*	*Action complete*
IPSF/GOH PAY MISSIONS		
COORD WITH HAITIAN SECURITY TEAM		
GATHER CONCEPT FROM OIC		
COORD SECURITY REQUIREMENTS		
ALERT OPERATIONAL DETACHMENT-ALPHA (ODA) ON GROUND		
AVN SPT		
PAY TEAM SPT-REQUIRES 2-3 PAX PER PAY MISSION		
TASK SOTF FOR SITE SECURITY		
PARTY LZ SPT		
COORD W/LOCAL IPSF/UNCIVPOL		
SEND WARNORD OUT		
REPATRIATION		
CONFIRM MESSAGE THROUGH EMBASSY, CMOC, COAST GUARD, AIR FORCE TACTICAL AIR LIFT CONTROL ELEMENT (TALCE)		
COORDINATE WITH CMOC FOR C^2 OF REPATS		
JOINT LOG SUPPORT COMMAND (JLSC)/LOG REQUIREMENTS - BUSES/TRUCKS TO TRANSPORT REPATS, RED CROSS - NORMALLY TRANSPORT TO CITY SQUARE, CONSIDER PORT AND AIR ARRIVAL OF REPATS		
SECURITY REQUIREMENTS		
PSYOP		
BAGGAGE DETAIL		
KEEP EMBASSY INFORMED		
MEDICAL SUPPORT - ON SITE FLA ONLY		
TAKE BULLHORNS FOR CROWD/REPAT CONTROL		
REMAIN FLEXIBLE; TIMES, PAX WILL CHANGE		
PREPARE FOR UNACCOMPANIED MINORS		

FIGURE 2 (Cont)

POST-SYNCHRONIZATION CHECKLIST (Cont)

MISSION:

DATE:

Required for this MSN	*MANEUVER (Cont)*	*Action complete*

ELECTION SUPPORT (Cont)

ASSEMBLING BOXES (HAITIAN LABOR)
SECURITY
✔ ASSEMBLY MATERIALS LOCATION
✔ REGISTRATION/ELECTION SITES
UN CIVPOL/IPSF/GOH COORD
EXTENT OF GOH INVOLVEMENT
SCHEDULE IPRs
CMOC COMMAND & CONTROL ELEMENT
CLASS IX SPT (TAPE, PAPER, PENS, RUBBER BANDS)
OUT-OF-SECTOR (OOS) MISSION SUPPORT REQUIRED
UNITS TO VISIT ELECTION SITE, CG's GUIDANCE
LANDING SHIP-VEHICLE SUPPORT
TACSAT REALIGNMENT
PSYOP MULTIMEDIA CAMPAIGN (THEMES, SPT REQ)
WHO COMMAND AND CONTROLS WHAT LOCATIONS
BATTLE-TRACKING TOOLS (JOINT OP GRAPHICS MAP, SYNC MATRIX)

NGO CONVOY SUPPORT

UNIT S5 NGO IPRs NECESSARY-DETERMINE REQUIREMENTS; SIZE, LOCATION, COMPOSITION OF FORCES
HOLD NGOs TO 48-HOUR RULE
PROVIDE MILITARY ESCORTS TO NGO CONVOYS
AERIAL RECON/SWT (OPCON)
GROUND/STATIC SECURITY REQ
CONVOY SECURITY REQ
TPT
✔CAMPAIGN
✔LEAFLETS AGAINST LOOTING
COMMS BETWEEN AIR/GROUND ESCORT

FIGURE 2 (Cont)

POST-SYNCHRONIZATION CHECKLIST (Cont)

Required for this MSN	*MANEUVER (Cont)*	*Action complete*

CMOC PROVIDES CHECKLIST WITH UPCOMING CONVOYS, CMOC UPDATES G3 OP, THEY COORDINATE WITH GOH NGOs DIRECTLY

CMOC PROVIDES BATTLE-TRACKING TOOL

REQUEST IPSF/UNCIVPOL ASSISTANCE

SPECIAL OPS TASK FORCE (SOTF) SUPPORT

COMCAM SUPPORT (DETERRENCE)

SYNCHRONIZE THE SUPPORT

COMMAND AND CONTROL

LOCATION OF KEY LDRS

MEANS OF COMMUNICATIONS

✔FM, TACSAT, MSE/MSRT, MOTOROLA; NETS TO MONITOR

EXECUTION CHECKLIST

FIRE SUPPORT

SCOUT/WPNS TM EMPLOYMENT

MORTAR EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERED

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

TRANSPORTATION REQUIREMENTS

✔FIVE TON, IFVs, LANDING SHIPS, ADDITIONAL HMMWVs

COORD FOR CL I, II, III, IV, XI

MSRs

✔TRAFFICABILITY

✔ALT MSRs

COORD W/LOGISTICS SUPPORT COMMAND

AERIAL RESUPPLY

MAINTENANCE ISSUES

REQUESTS FOR CIVILIAN LABORERS

ENGINEER

FORCE PROTECTION ISSUES/UPGRADES

RECONS (RTES)

BRIDGE CLASSIFICATION

COORD W/GOH/CIV (BROWN&ROOT) AGENCIES, HIRED LABOR, JLSC, J4

FIGURE 2 (End)

ENHANCING U.S. AND RUSSIAN RELATIONS THROUGH COMBINED PEACEKEEPING EXERCISES

by MG Randolph W. House and MAJ Mark R. Pires, 1st ID(M), Ft Riley, KS

Peacekeeper 95 (PK 95), a U.S. and Russian peacekeeping exercise was conducted from 22 October to 4 November 1995 at Ft Riley, KS. It marked the first time that Russian soldiers trained with American soldiers in the continental U.S. The exercise enabled soldiers from both countries to practice interoperability in peacekeeping operations and to share and develop tactics, techniques and procedures for peacekeeping tasks. Perhaps more importantly, the exercise allowed U.S. and Russian soldiers to develop personal relationships based on trust and mutual understanding. This article discusses the planning, execution and lessons learned from PK 95.

Mission and Planning

Peacekeeper 95 was a follow-on exercise to Peacekeeper 94, held in Totskoye, Russia. The 1st Infantry Division, Mechanized, received a directive from OSD and JCS in February 1995 to plan and execute a combined peacekeeping exercise with the 27th Guards Motorized Rifle Division (GMRD), Totskoye, Russia, and 3d Infantry Division, Mechanized, Wurzburg, Germany. The mission statement for the exercise, agreed upon by both division commanders, was as follows:

Elements of U.S. and Russian military forces conduct a combined peacekeeping exercise at Ft. Riley, KS, 25 October - 4 November 1995, to develop a relationship based on mutual trust and better understanding of each other; to enhance interoperability between forces in a peacekeeping role; and to promote military-to-military cooperation between forces.

From that mission statement, the U.S. and Russian commanders developed three overarching goals for the exercise. The first goal, enhancing military cooperation and trust between the U.S. and the Russian Federation, with long-term implications for world peace and stability, was the most important objective. The second goal, practicing and refining tactics, techniques, and procedures developed during PK 94, was accomplished during a 4-day peacekeeping exercise. To achieve the third goal, enhancing tactical interoperability in combined peacekeeping operations, the exercise was designed to force combined operations at the small unit level. A series of planning conferences enabled the 1ID(M) and 27 GMRD to conduct detailed planning and begin forging professional and personal relationships.

Exercise Schedule

Peacekeeper 95 was conducted in four major phases over a two-week period. During phase one, deployment, 105 soldiers from 3ID(M) and 153 soldiers from 27 GMRD deployed to FT Riley. The Russian contingent deployed in two IL-76 aircraft with the aircraft and crews remaining in the U.S. to conduct training with U.S. aircrews. Phase two consisted of the opening ceremony and lane training. Lane training provided participants a final opportunity to practice major peacekeeping tasks. The training, led by noncommissioned officers from the 1ID(M), provided an opportunity to demonstrate U.S. Army training methods and showcase the NCO as the primary trainer. The Russian Army does not have an NCO corps comparable to the U.S. model, and they found it surprising that we entrust so much responsibillity to our NCOs. Lane training also introduced the Russians to the after-action review (AAR).

CPX/FTX Scenario and Concept

The training scenario for PK 95 was designed to replicate actual peacekeeping operations as realistically as possible. The scenario was set in "Kanza," a fictitious country attempting to establish a new government after undergoing a devastating civil war. The war was fought between two factions.

Elements of the factions, splinter groups, refugees, and the media were intermingled in the buffer zone when the peacekeepers arrived. Over 200 soldiers from 1ID(M) served as role players to portray faction members, media personnel, civilians, and soldiers of the Kanza Army.

The scenario was developed to replicate a peacekeeping operation in which there exists formal consent by all parties on the presence and mission scope of the peacekeeping forces - Chapter VI of the United Nations charter. Hence, the peacekeepers deployed into a region in which the belligerents had already separated and the buffer zone was mutually agreed upon and in effect at the outset of the CPX/FTX. The mission statement of the peacekeeping forces was as follows:

U.S. and Russian contingents from the 1ID(M)(-) and the 27th GMRD(RU)(-), as part of UN Combined Peacekeeping Forces - Kanza, conduct combined peacekeeping operations in the established buffer zone to supervise, monitor, and verify observance of the truce between belligerents and help maintain a secure environment conducive to political stability and process.

The scope of the peacekeeping mission was limited to verifying and, where necessary, enforcing the terms of the peace agreement, within the buffer zone. The mission statement also included one of the gray areas of peacekeeping, "maintain a secure environment conducive to political stability and process." This part of the mission challenged the peacekeepers and stressed the employment of the rules of engagement (ROE). The scenario and events portrayed during the 4-day CPX/FTX were developed using various sources including publications from the Center for Army Lessons Learned, the "Russian- U.S. Guide for Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures of Peacekeeping Forces During the Conduct of Exercises," and the experiences of both Russian and U.S. past operations. The scenario and events were developed from a cross section of peacekeeping operations and were not based on events in Bosnia, or any other single area.

The 4-day peacekeeping exercise used a master events list (MEL) and computer simulation to drive the CPX/FTX. The U.S. and Russian forces each deployed one regimental/brigade-level headquarters and one battalion headquarters for the CPX and one company for the FTX. The remainder of the forces, including the remaining companies from the battalions, deployed for the CPX, and an additional battalion from each of the regimental/brigade units, were portrayed through simulation. As mentioned earlier, the training was designed to force interoperability at the small unit level. This was accomplished by creating a combined platoon-size movement checkpoint (MCP). Each national force contributed 11 soldiers to operate the MCP. Each national force also contributed 17 soldiers to form a combined quick reaction force (QRF). These two combined forces gave soldiers and small unit leaders an opportunity to work together closely and exchange experiences as well as individual techniques for accomplishing various tasks. A highly detailed MEL was developed to achieve the desired training objectives. The MEL, an hourly schedule of interactions between peacekeepers and role players, consisted of 100+ major events and numerous routine events. Major events included large numbers of refugees seeking assistance, civil disturbances, encounter with faction members in the buffer zone, and convoy escort missions. Routine events included civilian vehicles passing through the MCPs, and small groups seeking food or medical aid. Each event was designed to cause the peacekeepers to execute a specific training task, under the conditions established through the training scenario. The training tasks, conditions, and standards were taken from the "Guide for Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP) of Combined Peacekeeping Forces During the Conduct of Exercises."

The events on the MEL caused the peacekeepers to execute six major collective peacekeeping tasks found in the TTP. The six tasks were: operate a checkpoint; escort a convoy; react to civil disturbance; employ a quick reaction force; patrol and enforce the separation of belligerents. Each event on the MEL caused the peacekeepers to execute one, or a combination of more than one of these tasks. For example, some events involving large, angry mobs at the MCPs simultaneously provided training on the operation of a checkpoint, reaction to a civil disturbance, and employment of the QRF. The conditions of basic events were varied to train responses under changing circumstances.

For example, role players portraying media teams, complete with VCR camcorders, filmed civil disturbances at the MCPs, and attempted to interview leaders and soldiers during the disturbance. Additionally, routine vehicular traffic continued to move through the MCP as crowds were building. Changing the conditions of events trained the peacekeepers to deal with increasingly complex situations which required them to prioritize their actions.

The exercise was not designed to stress logistical systems. Logistical operations were simplified by the robust logistical base at Ft Riley and short resupply distances. The U.S. provided all logistical support. Nongovernmental agencies, which play major roles in actual peacekeeping operations, were replicated only to a minor degree.

Lessons Learned

Peacekeeper 95 resulted in a broad range of lessons learned from national philosophies of combined peacekeeping command and control to techniques at the individual task level.

Perspectives on Command and Control. Peacekeeper 95 highlighted differing U.S. and Russian perspectives regarding the command and control of combined peacekeeping forces. The PK 95 CPX/FTX command and control structure was designed to form a combined U.S. and Russian division-level staff. The intent was to have the U.S. and Russian forces contribute staff officers who would work together as an integrated staff. In reality, two national staffs, one U.S. and one Russian, collocated in adjacent rooms. Each staff operated under the command of the exercise commander which alternated daily between the two division commanders. The two staffs passed orders and reports to their respective national forces. The difference between the intended command and control structure, with one combined staff, and the actual outcome, two collocated but distinct staffs, can be explained by the differing perspectives the two nations brought to the exercise.

Figure 1 illustrates the difference between the U.S. and Russian perspectives on combined command and control. Neither perspective is particularly right or wrong. The difference in perspectives can possibly be explained by the historical experiences of each nation in combined operations.





Figure 1

The left side of figure 1 depicts the U.S. model of a combined staff. In the U.S. model, each force contributes to the staff based on that nation's capabilities and total force contribution. All staff sections are fully integrated into a single staff organized along the traditional G staff lines of responsibility. Command of forces from contributing nations is given to a commander of one country with a deputy or chief of staff from the other nations. The U.S. experience in World War II, NATO, and Korea has both shaped and reinforced this particular perception of the combined staff.

The right side of figure 1 depicts the Russian model of a combined staff. In this model, there are two national staffs which are collocated but distinct. The organization and composition of each national staff remain up to each nation. As in the U.S. model, command resides with a single commander from one nation with a deputy or chief of staff from another nation. The Russian model also includes a combat control center which is responsible for coordinating critical operational issues between the two national staffs. Each model has strengths and weaknesses. The U.S. model forms a more fully integrated staff, helping to ensure greater synchronization of effort. However, forming this type of staff requires a single, agreed-upon planning process with standard orders. Using this model is difficult if both nations do not speak a common language. The Russian model allows each nation to use its own national p1anning process and own orders.

However, with two distinct staffs, there is a greater chance the national efforts will not be synchronized toward one common goal. In the near future, the two nations will probably use the Russian model. The key to using either model is capitalizing on strengths and minimizing weaknesses.

The AAR Process. Peacekeeper 95 introduced the Russian participants to essential components of the U.S. training model. Use of simulations, MILES, and the after-action review process is not part of the Russian training model. Russian leaders expressed interest in simulations and MILES, requesting information on the capabilities and specification of various systems. The Russian reaction to the AAR process was particularly interesting.

The training exercise was structured with U.S. observer/controllers (O/Cs) located with each U.S. unit down to squad level. The U.S. O/Cs conducted AARs after each MEL event. A U.S. controller was also present with Russian units whenever they came into contact with role players. This arrangement was made to ensure that MEL events between Russian peacekeepers and U.S. role players took place as planned. The U.S. controller with Russian units was also able to serve as a training observer, if the Russian unit consented to receiving training feedback. The Russian forces brought "umpires" who observed Russian forces and graded their actions on a numerical scale. The give and take of the U.S. AAR process is very different from the graded, one-way feedback of the Russian process. Following each event at the combined MCP, the U.S. O/C gathered the U.S. and Russian forces together for an AAR. The umpire at the Russian MCP did not conduct AARs, but gathered the soldiers periodically to critique their performance.

Small Unit and Individual Soldier-Level Lessons. All participants learned valuable lessons at the small unit and individual soldier level. Soldiers from both nations improved interpersonal skills when dealing with civilians and members of factions. At the beginning of the exercise, both U.S. and Russian soldiers tended to treat civilians and faction members as enemies. During the course of the exercise, soldiers from both nations learned that they needed to change their mindset. The peacekeepers learned to display a friendly demeanor while still maintaining vigilance and force protection. Small unit leaders learned to use negotiation prior to using force. Early in the exercise, the peacekeepers failed to use controlled escalation of force which resulted in soldiers shooting into crowds or other undesired outcomes. However, during the course of the exercise, the peacekeepers learned to control events without having to resort to the use of force.

Operating together at the combined MCP was an excellent training experience for U.S. and Russian soldiers. Leaders at the MCP initially divided duties and positions along national lines. This was done to maximize command and control and minimize communication problems. During the course of the exercise, the two forces established hand and arm signals and other SOPs. Communication barriers were eventually overcome to the point where U.S. and Russian soldiers were mixed together.

The basic procedures and duties at the inspection point were easy to grasp, enabling the forces to combine immediately. Combining the soldiers at this level provided the opportunity for soldiers to exchange individual techniques. Russian soldiers, for example, demonstrated techniques for conducting personnel inspections in a more secure manner. Although this was an outstanding training experience, observers and leaders from both nations agreed that it would be impractical to integrate forces to this degree during actual operations.

NOTE: *This article is an abbreviation of the original. However, a training support package on PK 95 is available from CALL. The next PK exercise is scheduled in Russia in 1997. For more detailed information on this exercise, contact CPT Terry Morgan, CALL CTC Division, DSN 552-9598/3035 or Coml. (913) 684-9598/3035.* ✪

CALL TRAINING QUARTERLY *BULLETIN*

In an attempt to provide the best training possible for our soldiers, CALL is publishing a ***Training Quarterly*** bulletin with a focus on exchanging information and lessons at the battalion and company levels.

The intent of the publication is to improve unit training by creating a forum to share the best contemporary "How to Train" lessons and insights across the Total Army. The publication is to stay in bounds of FM 25-100 and FM 25-101.

The quarterly bulletin is designed to share training lessons among Active, National Guard and Reserve units. It will also assist the Army in embedding the principles of FM 25-101 in the Total Force.

The content draws from, and feeds back to, unit trainers. To make this concept work, it is absolutely necessary that units and trainers provide input to CALL to support this worthwhile training effort.

The publication of the ***Training Quarterly*** is not intended to compete with other Army magazines and journals.

The plan for publication entails creating the training bulletin over time on-line accessible from the World Wide Web (WWW) and quarterly reconfiguring the bulletin to paper and distributing it to the field by using existing CALL dissemination methods. This approach speeds information to units with Internet access as it is received and processed by CALL. Those units and commands without Web access will receive a paper copy once each quarter.

Thus, the publication is created electronically and converted to paper, in contrast to CALL's current system of creating in paper and converting to electronic media. This approach benefits the timeliness of disseminating lessons and information.

CALL will work with you to put your lessons and articles into a publishable form. Credit will be given to all authors and units. ***Your immediate response to participate by submitting potential lessons and articles to CALL would be appreciated.***

Several articles for the first ***Training Quarterly*** bulletin are on-line. The CALL WWW Homepage can be found at: http://call.army.mil:1100/call.html. The ***Training Quarterly*** is listed under the subject area - NEW STUFF (Training Quarterly**).**

Contact Dr. Lon Seglie for more information, DSN: 3035/2255, Coml: (913) 684-3035/2255, FAX, ext. 9564.✪

Battle Drill

React to Armor While Dismounted

by Captain Fred W. Johnson, CALL Collection Division
(Reprinted from *Infantry Magazine,* May-June 1995)

Most light infantry platoons and squads that rotate through the CTCs demonstrate a lack of proficiency in reacting to contact against armored vehicles. One reason for this is infrequent training with or against armor. More importantly, because our training materials do not offer a battle drill for reaction to this kind of threat, units have no frame of reference for planning and conducting this training. The result is slow and indecisive action against a very lethal opposing force.

The development of the training objectives for this drill must consider two separate conditions: The friendly unit identifies the enemy vehicle without being sighted by the enemy, or the enemy vehicle identifies the friendly unit first. Additionally, the contact may take place during daylight or during hours of limited visibility.

The friendly unit identifies the enemy vehicle first. When the vehicle is identified, the signal for halt is given, followed by a signal for enemy armored vehicle. If the platoon leader cannot see the vehicle, he moves forward to identify it and assess the situation. He must determine the availability of cover and concealment, the route to an assailable flank, and an attack by fire position. If the vehicle is within range of the platoon's antiarmor weapons, these weapons are deployed immediately to the flanks of the platoon oriented on the enemy vehicle. The unit should already be task-organized into several two-man or three-man AT4 teams with a leader responsible for their positioning. The weapons squad leader or the platoon sergeant positions the Dragons selected to engage the target in case the vehicle identifies the unit.

If the unit is identified, the command to fire is given immediately. The platoon forward observer initiates a call for fire to be executed on the platoon leader's command. This forces the enemy vehicle to button up, reducing the commander's and the gunner's field of vision. Given this intent, variable time fuse is used. Since the unit may close to within 200 or 300 meters of the vehicle, the fires should be from 60-mm or 81-mm mortars because of their smaller minimum safe distance.

Once route and attack-by-fire positions are identified, the platoon conducts bounding overwatch to those positions, ensuring that both the moving and the overwatching units have antiarmor capabilities. The Dragons remain in the overwatch and are positioned to ensure the best possibility for a first-round kill. The AT4 teams maneuver to an attack-by-fire position well within their range for a stationary target. The purpose of having both a support-by-fire with Dragons and an attack-by-fire with AT4 is to ensure that the unit has redundant means of destroying the vehicle.

Once both elements are in position, the platoon leader initiates the engagement, with the Dragons using the pair-fire method: One gunner fires while the other observes; if the first gunner misses, the second immediately engages the target. At this time, indirect fires are called. The engagement may be initiated with mortars to button up the enemy vehicle, but only if the unit does not have Dragons; if it has Dragons, the mortar fragments may cut the missile's wire. If both gunners miss, the attack-by-fire element initiates, using sequenced, pair, or volley fire.

During hours of limited visibility, the platoon leader should plan to use mortar or 40-mm illumination or parachute flares to illuminate targets for the AT4s. If the platoon does not have Dragons available - with their nightsights - illumination is critical for successful AT4 engagements. Ideally, the illumination should be fired from the support position instead of the attack-by-fire position to avoid compromising the engaging element.

The enemy vehicle identifies the friendly unit first. Although the most obvious reaction to being compromised by an armored vehicle is to break contact, this may not be the wisest choice. Unless cover is immediately available, it is unlikely that a dismounted platoon can successfully run away from a tank's main gun or coaxial machinegun.

The response to this situation must be immediate. The Dragon gunners, if within range of the enemy vehicle, immediately employ their weapons. Smoke is used, and the remaining personnel maneuver to the flank or a blind side of the vehicle. If possible, the AT4 teams attempt to close with the vehicle, and the forward observer immediately calls for fire.

The actions described here are a starting point for platoons in developing SOPs for reaction to an armored threat. These actions, at a minimum, should be addressed in the coordinating instructions of operations orders and should be rehearsed generically when the unit is fighting an enemy with armor capability. This training will help ensure that soldiers and leaders alike will be able to react with the required speed and precision when they unexpectedly encounter an armored vehicle.✪